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E-mail address: mhabegg@hispeed.ch (M. Abegg).Foreknowledge about the demands of an upcoming trial may be exploited to optimize behavioural
responses. In the current study we systematically investigated the beneﬁts of partial foreknowledge –
that is, when some but not all aspects of a future trial are known in advance. For this we used an ocular
motor paradigm with horizontal prosaccades and antisaccades. Predictable sequences were used to cre-
ate three partial foreknowledge conditions: one with foreknowledge about the stimulus location only,
one with foreknowledge about the task set only, and one with foreknowledge about the direction of
the required response only. These were contrasted with a condition of no-foreknowledge and a condition
of complete foreknowledge about all three parameters. The results showed that the three types of fore-
knowledge affected saccadic efﬁciency differently. While foreknowledge about stimulus-location had no
effect on efﬁciency, task foreknowledge had some effect and response-foreknowledge was as effective as
complete foreknowledge. Foreknowledge effects on switch costs followed a similar pattern in general, but
were not speciﬁc for switching of the trial attribute for which foreknowledge was available. We conclude
that partial foreknowledge has a differential effect on efﬁciency, most consistent with preparatory acti-
vation of a motor schema in advance of the stimulus, with consequent beneﬁts for both switched and
repeated trials.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Successful behaviour often requires the ability to respond rap-
idly and accurately to events occurring in the environment. Behav-
ioural efﬁciency may be enhanced by exploiting foreknowledge
about the upcoming task, which for the purposes of this study is
deﬁned as ‘completely reliable information about some or all prop-
erties of an upcoming trial from the historical context of previous
trials’ (Barton, Kuzin, Polli, & Manoach, 2006b). Complete reliabil-
ity distinguishes foreknowledge from prior-probability effects, in
which a cue is often used to indicate that some property of the
upcoming trial (e.g. a certain target location) has a certain likeli-
hood of occurrence (e.g. (Carpenter & Williams, 1995; Dreisbach,
Haider, & Kluwe, 2002; Schiller, Haushofer, & Kendall, 2004)). In
foreknowledge, that likelihood is 100%: hence, foreknowledge
can be considered a special class of prior-probability effects.
Foreknowledge may exert effects through inﬂuencing trial
preparation. Another means of doing this is through pre-cueing,
by providing information about what will be required in that trial,ll rights reserved.with sufﬁcient lead time before the appearance of the stimulus to
allow subjects to use the cue to prepare, Although some investiga-
tors consider pre-cueing during the current trial a form of fore-
knowledge (Schiller et al., 2004), pre-cueing does not require use
of information from trial history. Previous studies have shown that
‘extrinsic’ information from preceding cues and ‘intrinsic’ informa-
tion based on foreknowledge from sequence information have dif-
ferent effects on behaviour, and hence should not be considered as
equivalent (Barton, Greenzang, Hefter, Edelman, & Manoach,
2006a; Sohn & Anderson, 2003). In contrast to pre-cueing, which
relies on information given within the trial, foreknowledge relies
on information about the larger sequence, and thus can inform
us on how working memory and contextual information from
outside the conﬁnes of the current trial are used to inﬂuence
behaviour. Contextual effects are highly relevant to real-life perfor-
mance, given that our responses to the environment are not
isolated acts but form part of a historical continuum of activity.
In the past, several foreknowledge studies have examined com-
pletely predictable tasks, in which the type of stimulus, the task-
set, and the speciﬁc response required were all known in advance
(Kingstone & Klein, 1993; Moschner & Zangemeister, 1993; Pare &
Munoz, 1996; Schiller et al., 2004; Wegner & Fahle, 1999). Not sur-
1 It is possible that making the timing of trial events also predictable may allow
subjects to better synchronize preparatory processes. However, it is not clear whether
this timing effect modulates all preparatory processes equally, and if not whether this
should be considered a confound or a statistical advantage. Furthermore, paradigms
with predictable timing have the disadvantage of increasing the number of
anticipatory responses, and hence the number of rejected trials (Barton et al., 2006a).
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duced and there were more anticipatory responses. Such results
suggest that foreknowledge about upcoming events can be used
to optimize behaviour and increase the efﬁciency of our responses
to the environment. However, what is not yet known is whether all
types of information about the upcoming event are useful for
behavioural optimization, or if only certain information can be
used to improve efﬁciency. To determine this requires studies with
partial foreknowledge paradigms, in which only some aspects of
the upcoming trial are known and others not. Such partial fore-
knowledge designs have not been used frequently. In a recently
proposed taxonomy, partial foreknowledge was classiﬁed accord-
ing to the type of information that can be determined ahead of
time from trial history (Barton et al., 2006b). Thus one may know
where the stimulus will appear (stimulus-location-foreknowl-
edge), the type of task to be performed (task foreknowledge) or
the speciﬁc response that will be required (response-
foreknowledge).
This taxonomy leads to a number of simple questions regarding
the potential inﬂuence of partial foreknowledge on behaviour:
ﬁrst, does partial foreknowledge enhance performance in the man-
ner that complete foreknowledge does; second, is partial fore-
knowledge as effective in optimizing performance as complete
foreknowledge; and third, do the different types of foreknowledge
differ in their effects on behaviour. If the latter is answered in the
afﬁrmative, this may indicate that the contextual effects of fore-
knowledge may operate through selective effects on some but
not all of the cognitive processes involved in saccade generation.
Thus, in this study we systematically compared the effects of
partial foreknowledge of: (a) stimulus location, (b) task and (c) re-
sponse, to baseline conditions in which there is either complete
foreknowledge (all dimensions following a predictable sequence)
or no-foreknowledge at all (all dimensions following random se-
quences). We used a saccadic paradigm, using prosaccades, in
which the subject looks toward a suddenly appearing stimulus,
and antisaccades, in which the subject looks in the opposite direc-
tion (Hallett, 1978; Hallett & Adams, 1980). For each of these three
task dimensions there are two alternatives: (a) a right or left stim-
ulus, (b) a prosaccade or antisaccade task, and (c) a rightward or
leftward response. Without foreknowledge, any given trial may
thus require one of four behaviours: a rightward prosaccade, a left-
ward prosaccade, a rightward antisaccade, or a leftward antisac-
cade. With partial foreknowledge of any one of the three
dimensions, though, the set of possible behaviours is reduced by
half. Thus, knowing that the stimulus will be on the right reduces
the set of options to a rightward prosaccade and a leftward antisac-
cade. Knowing that the task will be an antisaccade reduces the set
to a rightward and leftward antisaccade, while knowing that the
desired response will be a rightward saccade reduces the set to a
rightward prosaccade and a rightward antisaccade. Complete fore-
knowledge, of course, reduces the set of possible behaviours to one.
We hypothesized that, compared to the no-foreknowledge condi-
tion, complete foreknowledge would signiﬁcantly enhance perfor-
mance, reducing latencies and error rates, while the effects of
partial foreknowledge would be intermediate. We also hypothe-
sized that the different forms of partial foreknowledge would differ
from each other in their effects on saccades.
In addition to examining the effects of foreknowledge on sacc-
adic performance, we included a secondary analysis on switch
costs, the difference in performance between trials in which a par-
ticular dimension was changed and those in which it was repeated.
Many studies on task-switching show that performance is better
on trials that repeat the parameters of the prior trial, than those
in which these are changed (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Meiran,
Chorev, & Sapir, 2000; Monsell, Yeung, & Azuma, 2000; Rogers &
Monsell, 1995). In part this is due to a need for ‘active re-conﬁgu-ration of the response system when demands change in switched
trials, which is reﬂected in switch costs (Monsell et al., 2000;
Rogers & Monsell, 1995). If repeated trials are already performing
optimally, then it may be that these will not beneﬁt signiﬁcantly
from foreknowledge; rather, it may be that foreknowledge effects
are particularly manifest on trials that require re-conﬁguration. If
so, this will be revealed as a signiﬁcant reduction of switch costs
in conditions with foreknowledge. As switching can involve either
stimulus location, task or response, we investigated whether par-
tial foreknowledge about any of these three dimensions allows
the subject to reduce the added costs incurred by switching. As
above, we explored the hypothesis that the different partial fore-
knowledge conditions would differ in their effects on switch costs.
Furthermore, our paradigm allowed us to determine whether the
beneﬁts of partial foreknowledge about one particular dimension
improved switching performance for that dimension alone, or if
the beneﬁt generalized to switching in all dimensions.2. Methods
2.1. Subjects
10 healthy subjects, seven of whom were male, with median
age 33.5 years (range 24–43) participated. All had normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision and viewed the stimuli with both eyes
and uncorrected vision. None had a history of psychiatric or neuro-
logical disease. The protocol was approved by the institutional re-
view boards of Vancouver General Hospital and the University of
British Columbia, and all subjects gave informed consent in accor-
dance with the declaration of Helsinki.2.2. Eye movement apparati and protocol
Subjects sat in dim illumination 57 cm away from a 22’’ NEC
Multisync FE 2111SB monitor that presented stimuli at 85 Hz, with
their heads stabilized by a chin-rest. Eye movements were
recorded by a video-based eyetracking system (Eyelink 1000, SR
Research Ltd, Mississauga, Canada). Stimuli, trials and experimen-
tal blocks were created with SR Research Experiment Builder 1.1.2.
Each experiment started with calibration on the default 9-point
grid, which was accepted if there was an angular error of less than
1 for each point tested. Between blocks the system was checked
for offset error by having the subject ﬁxate a target at screen cen-
ter. If there was an offset error greater than 1, we repeated the cal-
ibration with the 9-point grid.
Each trial started with a white ﬁxation cross on a black back-
ground. After a randomly determined interval of 1s or 1.5s,1 the ﬁx-
ation cross was replaced by an instructional cue, which was either a
red ‘X’ spanning 2 of visual angle, indicating that an antisaccade was
required, or a green circle with an inner diameter of 2 of visual an-
gle, indicating that a prosaccade should be performed. Simultaneous
with the instructional cue, the stimulus, a white ring of 20 pixels
diameter (0.7 of visual angle), appeared either to the right or to
the left on the horizontal meridian, at an eccentricity of 427 pixels
(17 of visual angle). Both the stimulus and the instructional cue re-
mained on the screen until the subject made a saccade with a min-
imum amplitude of 3 and an endpoint located within a radius of
150 pixels (6) from the goal of the eye movement. Once this
M. Abegg et al. / Vision Research 51 (2011) 215–221 217occurred the screen display was replaced 500 ms later by the
ﬁxation screen for the next trial.
Trials were given in blocks of 41 trials. Before each foreknowl-
edge block, subjects were informed about the nature of the predict-
able sequence that would be occurring in that block, if any. Each
block was preceded by a practice block of 20 trials that were iden-
tical to the experimental blocks, and therefore also served to dem-
onstrate the predictable or random sequences that would occur in
that block. Blocks were divided into one of ﬁve conditions, depend-
ing on whether the stimulus location, task set, or response direc-
tion followed a random or predictable sequence within the block.
Predictable sequences followed an AABB pattern, in which one va-
lue of the dimension occurred twice, and then the other value oc-
curred twice. This generated both repetitions and switches of the
values for that dimension, which could be contrasted to assess
switching costs for that dimension (Barton et al., 2006a; Rogers &
Monsell, 1995).
2.3. Conditions
1. The no-foreknowledge condition contained random sequences
for all three parameters: stimulus location, task-set and
response direction.
2. The stimulus-location-foreknowledge condition contained pre-
dictable AABB sequences of stimulus location (i.e. two left-
hemiﬁeld stimuli followed by two right-hemiﬁeld stimuli),
but random sequences of task-set and response direction.
3. The task-foreknowledge condition contained predictable AABB
sequences of task-set (i.e. two prosaccades followed by two
antisaccades), but random sequences of stimulus location and
response direction.
4. The response-foreknowledge condition contained predictable
AABB sequences of response direction (i.e. two leftward sac-
cades followed by two rightward saccades), but random
sequences of stimulus location and task-set. Thus, in this condi-
tion subjects would know the direction of the saccade they
were supposed to perform, but they would not know whether
this would be a prosaccade or an antisaccade, or whether the
stimulus would be located on the left or the right.
5. The complete-foreknowledge condition had predictable
sequences for all three parameters. However, it is not possible
to construct complete foreknowledge blocks with AABB
sequences for all three parameters. Rather, we constructed
blocks with an AABB sequence for two of the parameters, with
the third parameter held constant. Thus, for example, one pre-
dictable block had only left-hemiﬁeld stimuli, with an AABB
sequence of task-set (prosaccade - prosaccade – antisaccade –
antisaccade) and therefore an AABB sequence of response direc-
tion (left–left–right–right). There were six such complete fore-
knowledge blocks, two with stimulus location held constant
(one with left hemiﬁeld and two with right-hemiﬁeld stimuli),
two with task-set held constant (one with prosaccades only
and one with antisaccades only), and two with response direc-
tion held constant (one with leftward saccades and one with
rightward saccades).
For the conditions of no-foreknowledge and partial foreknowl-
edge (stimulus-location-foreknowledge, task-foreknowledge, and
response-foreknowledge), we presented two blocks of 41 trials for
each condition. For the complete-foreknowledge condition, we
presented one block of 41 trials for each of the six different blocks.
While this gave us twice as many complete foreknowledge trials as
in the other conditions, it provided us with equivalent numbers of
switched and repeated trials from AABB sequences for the param-
eters of stimulus location, task-set and response direction, as in the
partial foreknowledge conditions.The experimental session was divided into two halves, each
containing one block of the no-foreknowledge and partial fore-
knowledge conditions, and three of the six complete foreknowl-
edge blocks. The order in the ﬁrst half was randomly determined,
with the order in the second half being the reverse of the order
in the ﬁrst half. Overall, the experiment contained 574 experimen-
tal trials per subject.
2.4. Data analysis
Data was analyzed using SR Research Data Viewer 1.7.5. Sac-
cades were detected when eye velocity reached 31/sec, accelera-
tion exceeded 9100/sec2, and position changed by more than
0.15. From the recorded data of each trial we analyzed the ﬁrst
saccade after stimulus onset with an amplitude > 3. Reaction time
was calculated as the time from stimulus onset to saccadic onset.
We excluded trials in which the ﬁrst saccade (a) had a reaction
time of less than 80 ms or more than 800 ms, (b) had a starting
point greater than 50 pixels (2) from screen center, or (c) had a
mean trajectory more than 45 away from the horizontal meridian,
with mean trajectory being the vector between starting point and
endpoint of the saccadic eye movement. These exclusion criteria
eliminated 14.1% of all trials (ranging from 5.7% to 17.6% between
subjects). The remaining saccades were divided into correct and
erroneous saccades, with correct saccades having a trajectory
within 45 of the desired eye movement, and erroneous saccades
having a trajectory within 45 of the alternate location in the other
hemiﬁeld. To minimize the contribution of other phenomena like
post-error slowing, only trials that were preceded by trials with
correct saccadic responses were included in the analysis.
For each condition we calculated error rate as the number of
erroneous saccades divided by the total number of eligible sac-
cades. For latency we analyzed only the response times from direc-
tionally correct saccades. Of all trials 82.3% were included for this
analysis. For prosaccades and antisaccades in each condition we
calculated for each subject a mean accuracy and latency score.
From these means we derived an inverse efﬁciency score. Since
subjects can vary reaction time inversely with accuracy – the
‘speed-accuracy trade-off’ (Fitts, 1954) – performance may best
be reﬂected in a single variable that combines the two. The inverse
efﬁciency score does this by dividing latency by accuracy rate,
resulting in an index that is lower for more efﬁcient performance
(Morein-Zamir, Chua, Franks, Nagelkerke, & Kingstone, 2007;
Townsend & Ashby, 1983). We analyzed the impact of foreknowl-
edge on inverse efﬁciency scores by using a general linear model
with main factors of saccade type (prosaccade, antisaccade) and
foreknowledge condition (none, stimulus location, task-set, re-
sponse and complete), with subject as a random factor, using
JMP 7.0.2 (SAS Institute Inc; www.jmp.com). We then used Tukey’s
honestly signiﬁcant difference (HSD) test at a signiﬁcance level of
0.05 to identify signiﬁcant pairwise contrasts.
We performed a second analysis on switch costs. For this we
classiﬁed each trial on the basis of whether it repeated or switched
each of the three dimensions in the prior trial: that is, whether it
had the same or different stimulus location, task-set, or response
direction as the preceding trial. Again, we only included trials in
which the prior response had been correct. We calculated the
mean latency and error rate for switched and repeated trials as
above, and derived the inverse efﬁciency score for each switching
dimension (stimulus location, task and response) and saccade type
in each foreknowledge condition. Switch costs were then calcu-
lated by subtracting the inverse efﬁciency score for repeated trials
from that for switched trials. We statistically analyzed these in-
verse efﬁciency-switch costs using a general linear model with
main factors of saccade type (prosaccade, antisaccade), foreknowl-
edge condition (none, stimulus location, task-set, response and
all saccades
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sponse), with subject as a random factor. Individual contrasts were
investigated with Tukey’s honestly signiﬁcant difference (HSD) test
at a signiﬁcance level of 0.05 to identify signiﬁcant pairwise
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3.1. Effects of partial foreknowledge on saccadic efﬁciency
There was a trend toward signiﬁcance for saccade type
(F(1,81) = 3.7, p = 0.057), with longer reaction times for antisac-
cades than prosaccades. There was a main effect of foreknowledge
condition (F(4,81) = 43.1, p < 0.0001), but no signiﬁcant interaction
between saccade type and foreknowledge condition (F(4,81) = 0.95,
p = 0.44), indicating that there was no evidence that foreknowledge
affected prosaccades and antisaccades differently. Collapsing across
saccade type, Tukey’s HSD test showed signiﬁcant pairwise con-
trasts between all foreknowledge conditions, with the exception
of contrasts between response-foreknowledge and complete-
foreknowledge (F(1,81) = 1.62, p = 0.20) and between stimulus-
location-foreknowledge and no-foreknowledge (F(1,81) < 0.01, p =
0.99). Thus knowing stimulus location does not improve saccadic
efﬁciency over no foreknowledge at all, while knowing the direc-
tion of the response alone makes performance as efﬁcient as know-
ing all aspects of the upcoming trial. Knowingwhether the task is to
be a prosaccade or an antisaccade results in an intermediate bene-
ﬁt: better than no knowledge at all but not as good as complete
foreknowledge (Fig. 1).Er
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Fig. 1. Foreknowledge effects on saccadic efﬁciency. Stimulus foreknowledge has
no effect on saccadic efﬁciency, task foreknowledge has some effect and response-
foreknowledge is as effective as complete foreknowledge. Saccadic efﬁciency is a
combined score of saccadic latency divided by one minus the error rate, both are
shown below separately for prosaccades and antisaccades. Bars indicate group
mean values of subject means and error bars represent the group standard error.
Horizontal bars indicate statistically signiﬁcant difference. NF = no foreknowledge,
SF = stimulus foreknowledge, TF = task foreknowledge, RF = response foreknowl-
edge, CF = complete foreknowledge.3.2. Effects of partial foreknowledge on switch costs
This analysis examined the effects of the different types of fore-
knowledge - in particular the three different types of partial fore-
knowledge (stimulus location, task, response) - and their impact
on the three different types of switching (stimulus location, task,
response). The variable is switch-cost efﬁciency, which assesses
the difference between switched trials and repeated trials. A main
effect of foreknowledge condition would indicate that foreknowl-
edge does affect switch costs, addressing our ﬁrst question. The
Tukey’s HSD test would then explore our second question, whether
all partial foreknowledge conditions were equivalent or different in
their effect on switch costs. Finally, interactions between fore-
knowledge condition and switching dimension – i.e. whether the
switch involved the stimulus, the task or the response – would ad-
dress our third question, whether switch-cost beneﬁts from fore-
knowledge were speciﬁc to the trial property about which
foreknowledge was given, or generalized to all dimensions.
There were signiﬁcant main effects of switching dimension
(F(2261) = 5.27, p = 0.0057) and foreknowledge condition
(F(4261) = 7.9, p < 0.0001), but not of saccade type (F(1261) = 1.07,
p = 0.30). A key ﬁndingwas that no interaction reached signiﬁcance.
For switching dimension, Tukey’s HSD test showed that task-switch
costs were higher than either stimulus-switch costs (F(1261) =
12.72,p < 0.001) or response-switch costs (F(1261) = 16.96,p <
0.001). For foreknowledge condition, Tukey’s HSD test showed dif-
ferences: (a) between no-foreknowledge and either response-fore-
knowledge (F(1261) = 12.91,p < 0.001) or complete-foreknowledge
(F(1261) = 21.10,p < 0.001), (b) between stimulus-location-fore-
knowledge and task-foreknowledge (F(1261) = 7.86,p = 0.006),
response-foreknowledge (F(1261) = 23.04,p < 0.001), or complete-
foreknowledge (F(1261) = 33.65,p < 0.001) and (c) between task-
foreknowledge and complete-foreknowledge (F(1261) = 8.97,p =
0.003) (Fig. 2). These results are quite similar to those on overall
saccadic efﬁciency.Our analysis of switch costs was also directed at a speciﬁc ques-
tion, whether foreknowledge for a speciﬁc dimension would selec-
tively reduce switch costs for switches involving that dimension.
The fact that there was no signiﬁcant interaction between switch-
ing dimension and foreknowledge condition suggests that this is
not the case. To address this further we performed separate a priori
general linear models for each type of switch cost, with main factor
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Fig. 2. Foreknowledge effects on switching costs. The upper graph shows the
inverse efﬁciency-switch costs for the ﬁve foreknowledge conditions. Task-switch
costs, stimulus-switch costs and response-switch costs are shown. Foreknowledge
leads to reduced switch costs, in a pattern similar to saccadic efﬁciency. Partial
foreknowledge effects were not speciﬁc for switching of the trial attribute for which
foreknowledge was available. Horizontal bars indicate statistically signiﬁcant
difference. The lower panels show the latency and error rate components of the
inverse efﬁciency-switch costs separately. NF = no foreknowledge, SF = stimulus
foreknowledge, TF = task foreknowledge, RF = response foreknowledge, CF =
complete foreknowledge.
M. Abegg et al. / Vision Research 51 (2011) 215–221 219of foreknowledge condition and subject as a random effect, fol-
lowed by Tukey’s HSD test to determine the effects of different
types of foreknowledge on that particular switch cost. We col-
lapsed across both prosaccades and antisaccades, given the lack
of main effects or interactions found in the ﬁrst analysis of switch
costs. We also performed a priori linear contrasts to determine if
there was a signiﬁcant difference between no-foreknowledge and
foreknowledge speciﬁcally for the dimension being switched.
a) Stimulus-switch costs: There was a signiﬁcant main effect of
foreknowledge condition (F(4,36) = 5.63,p = 0.0013). Tukey’s HSD
test showed signiﬁcant differences between complete-foreknowl-
edge and no-foreknowledge (F(1,36) = 8.90,p = 0.005), and between
stimulus-location-foreknowledge and response-foreknowledge
(F(1,36) = 10.70,p = 0.002), task-foreknowledge (F(1,36) = 9.69,p =
0.004) or complete-foreknowledge (F(1,36) = 12.92,p < 0.001). Of
note, there was no difference between no-foreknowledge and
stimulus-location-foreknowledge (linear contrast, F(1,36) = 0.37,
p = 0.54).
b) Task-switch costs: There was a signiﬁcant main effect of fore-
knowledge condition (F(4,36) = 6.04, p = 0.0008). Tukey’s HSD test
showed signiﬁcant differences between complete-foreknowledge
and all foreknowledge conditions except response-foreknowledge
(F(1,36) = 0.96,p = 0.33). Of note, there was no signiﬁcant differ-
ence between no-foreknowledge and task-foreknowledge (linear
contrast, F(1,36) = 0.0222, p = 0.882).
c) Response-switch costs: There was a trend toward signiﬁcance
for foreknowledge condition (F(4,36) = 2.1256,p = 0.0977). Tukey’s
HSD test showed no signiﬁcant differences. Of note, there was no
signiﬁcant difference between no-foreknowledge and response-
foreknowledge (F(1,36) = 1.756, p = 0.193).
To sum up, these results conﬁrm a beneﬁt of foreknowledge on
switch costs, in keeping with the hypothesis that its optimizing ef-
fects may be particularly evident in reducing re-conﬁguration costs
on switched trials. The results also suggest, somewhat counter-
intuitively, that foreknowledge does not reduce switch-costs in
the speciﬁc dimension about which foreknowledge is provided.
Rather, beneﬁts appear to be general and to follow the pattern evi-dent in overall saccadic efﬁciency. Complete foreknowledge re-
duces all types of switch costs to nearly zero (Fig. 2), response-
and task-foreknowledge have some beneﬁt on all switching – with
the paradoxical exception that task-foreknowledge does not bene-
ﬁt task-switch costs – while stimulus-location-foreknowledge
does not help with any type of switch cost.4. Discussion
Our results ﬁrst conﬁrm that complete foreknowledge about an
upcoming trial increases saccadic efﬁciency, as a number of studies
have previously demonstrated (Kingstone & Klein, 1993; Moschner
& Zangemeister, 1993; Pare & Munoz, 1996; Schiller et al., 2004;
Wegner & Fahle, 1999). Second, they show that partial foreknowl-
edge about either stimulus location, task-set or response location
do not have equivalent effects on saccadic efﬁciency. Stimulus-
location-foreknowledge does not improve saccadic efﬁciency, re-
sponse-foreknowledge is as effective as complete foreknowledge
and task foreknowledge imparts an intermediate beneﬁt, with efﬁ-
ciency better than that with no-foreknowledge but not as good as
that with complete foreknowledge. Third, we examined switch
costs, to determine if the processes involved in re-conﬁguration
of trial demands would beneﬁt from foreknowledge. We found
general effects that roughly paralleled those on saccadic efﬁciency.
Of note, knowledge about an upcoming switch in a speciﬁc dimen-
sion (e.g. task) did not reduce the switch cost for that speciﬁc
dimension any more than it did for switches in the other dimen-
sions. All told, our results show that not all types of foreknowledge
can be used to optimize behavioural efﬁciency.5. Partial foreknowledge and saccadic efﬁciency
Compared to complete foreknowledge, fewer studies have
examined the effects of partial foreknowledge, and none have di-
rectly contrasted different forms of partial foreknowledge. The
one most similar study of which we are aware also studied prosac-
cades and antisaccades under conditions of response-foreknowl-
edge, stimulus-location-foreknowledge, complete foreknowledge
and no-foreknowledge (Evdokimidis, Constantinidis, Liakopoulos,
& Papageorgiou, 1996). However, it is not clear whether their re-
sponse-foreknowledge condition corresponds to response-
foreknowledge or task foreknowledge in our taxonomy (although
we suspect the latter). Also, because their study focused on
explaining the relative latency difference between prosaccades
and antisaccades, their analysis did not examine the effects of
foreknowledge condition on the error rate or latency of each
saccade type. Hence the questions that we wished to answer
cannot be addressed from their data.
A number of other studies, however, have data relevant to one
or another of the types of partial foreknowledge in our report.
For task foreknowledge, several studies have reported that task
foreknowledge enhances saccadic performance in either error rate
or latency (Barton et al., 2006a; Hsieh & Chen, 2007; Monsell,
Sumner, & Waters, 2003; Ruthruff, Remington, & Johnston, 2001;
Sohn & Anderson, 2003; Sohn & Carlson, 2000). Some have sug-
gested that this beneﬁt depends on the degree of certainty, with
‘‘unreliable’’ task foreknowledge – i.e. prior probability less than
1 – creating less beneﬁt than reliable foreknowledge (Dreisbach
et al., 2002; Kleinsorge & Gajewski, 2008). For stimulus-location-
foreknowledge there are few relevant data. Some studies have
reported that increased stimulus predictability reduces response
latencies for prosaccades and antisaccades (Carpenter & Williams,
1995; Dorris & Munoz, 1998; Koval, Ford, & Everling, 2004), but
since in these experiments the task was constant (prosaccade or
antisaccade), these prior probability studies are more relevant to
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response-foreknowledge condition, where the subject knows
which direction the saccade will take, but not the combination of
stimulus and task that will generate that response, we are not
aware of any prior studies.
The fact that response-foreknowledge provides a signiﬁcant
enhancement of saccadic efﬁciency that is essentially equivalent
to that seen with complete foreknowledge is perhaps not surpris-
ing. It may be that in both of these situations the subject is able
to prepare a directionally speciﬁc motor response in advance. That
is, all a subject may need to know is that a rightward saccade is the
correct response, regardless of whether it is a prosaccade or an
antisaccade. The stimulus/cue onset then merely triggers the exe-
cution of this ‘pre-set’ motor response without requiring computa-
tions regarding stimulus location and task set selection. In such a
scenario, one might regard the resulting saccade as a ‘substituted’
response that bypasses the usual stimulus and task processing in-
volved in making a saccade to a target.
The contrast between stimulus-location-foreknowledge and
task-foreknowledge is of greater interest. In neither of these situa-
tions can a single directionally speciﬁc motor response be created
in advance, since it cannot be known until the stimulus appears in
which direction the saccade must be made. Despite the fact that
both of these foreknowledge conditions reduce the set of behav-
ioural options to two, only task-foreknowledge shows beneﬁt com-
pared to no-foreknowledge. Furthermore, the pairwise contrasts
conﬁrm that saccadic efﬁciency is superior with task-foreknowl-
edge than with stimulus-location-foreknowledge. Thus, knowing
whether one is to perform an antisaccade or a prosaccade is better
than knowing whether the stimulus will be on the left or the right.
The lack of beneﬁt from stimulus-location-foreknowledge in
our paradigm has several possible explanations. First, if one con-
ceives of the transformation from stimulus via task set to response
as a simple cognitive model of sequential feedforward stages, then
theoretically it should be possible to shorten processing time and
enhance efﬁciency by pre-programming information in any of
these three stages in advance of trial onset. On this basis our
results suggest that stimulus processing is impermeable to fore-
knowledge. Indeed, this would be consistent with the conclusions
of a study of priming of stimulus-related processes in task switch-
ing, that because of their automatic nature stimulus-driven
processes are less likely to reﬂect internal factors like prediction
than other cognitive processes like executive control (Sohn &
Anderson, 2003). Another way of viewing this is that the efﬁciency
of stimulus processing may be optimal already, limiting further
improvement by foreknowledge.
A second, somewhat related possibility is that stimulus appear-
ance in our paradigm serves two purposes, one being to indicate
the location of the target, and the other being an initiation signal
for saccadic execution. If the computation of location is at least
as efﬁcient as that for the initiation process, then there will be
no beneﬁt from improving the former, as the latter will then as-
sume the role of the rate-limiting process.
A third possibility may be that the stimulus and task are not
programmed in serial. While response preparation needs to be per-
formed after stimulus localization, this is not necessarily true of
task selection. Since the task cue and the stimulus occur simulta-
neously in our design, it may be that both task selection and stim-
ulus localization occur in parallel. If task selection is the more
demanding process, then any foreknowledge beneﬁts in stimulus
processing will not be apparent in reaction times or efﬁciency.
From single cell recordings in monkeys while they perform
saccadic eye movements, a considerable amount is known about
the preparatory activity patterns in oculomotor structures. The
superior colliculus for example is involved in visual target selection
(Basso & Wurtz, 1998), saccade selection (Glimcher & Sparks,1992) and saccade preparation (Dorris, Pare, & Munoz, 1997). Sev-
eral motor responses may be prepared in advance (Dorris & Munoz,
1998) and expectancy about the prior probability for saccadic tar-
get alters activity levels at the corresponding visuotopic locations
of the superior colliculus (Basso & Wurtz, 1998). On this basis it
is not surprising that complete foreknowledge and response-
foreknowledge speed up reaction time: both allow the preparation
of a single oculomotor response, with presumably higher activity
peaks and thus faster response times. In the task-foreknowledge
condition, on the other hand, two motor responses are possible
and both may be prepared in advance, thereby explaining the
intermediate beneﬁt. We speculate that for both the stimulus-
location-foreknowledge condition and the no-foreknowledge
condition no response preparation is possible. This might be due
to the conﬂicting activity patterns of antisaccades and prosaccades,
which appear unpredictably in these two conditions: Preparation
of an antisaccade involves suppression of a reﬂexive prosaccade
(Munoz & Everling, 2004) that conﬂicts with the preparation of a
prosaccade, which requires activation rather than suppression.6. Foreknowledge and switch costs
Our examination of switch costs was motivated by current
models of task-switching (Meiran et al., 2000), which include both
active re-conﬁguration effects (Monsell et al., 2000; Rogers & Mon-
sell, 1995) and passive inertia effects persisting from the prior trial
(Allport et al., 1994). Active re-conﬁguration is triggered by the
appearance of the instructional cue. For task set, the latency switch
costs are greatest when the cue-stimulus interval is short, and
gradually reach a minimum value as this interval approaches
800 ms, suggesting that active re-conﬁguration is completed by
800 ms after cue onset (Meiran et al., 2000). By having our cues
simultaneous with our stimuli, our experimental design ensured
that costs of active re-conﬁguration would be included in measures
of stimulus-to-response latencies of our data. We asked whether
active re-conﬁguration of various trial dimensions could speciﬁ-
cally beneﬁt from foreknowledge regarding that dimension. Our
analyses suggest that the answer is No. Rather, beneﬁts in switch-
ing efﬁciency parallel the beneﬁts in general saccadic efﬁciency.
When either response or complete foreknowledge led to more
optimized saccadic responses, all switch costs were also reduced.
In contrast, there were little or no beneﬁts to switch costs from
task or stimulus-location- foreknowledge.
The fact that task-foreknowledge does not improve task-switch
costs is consistent with previous studies. It replicates a result in
one of our prior saccade studies, showing that a predictable task
sequence did not reduce task-switch costs in latency or error rate
(Barton et al., 2006a), a result that we replicated with the Stroop
test (Barton et al., 2006b), in which the task switches between
stimulus dimensions, rather than the stimulus–response mappings
involved in prosaccade/antisaccade studies. All of these results are
in agreement with other studies that also do not ﬁnd any reduction
in the costs of task switching with task foreknowledge (Dreher,
Koechlin, Ali, & Grafman, 2002; Koch, 2005; Lien, Schweickert, &
Proctor, 2003; Sohn & Anderson, 2001; Sohn & Anderson, 2003;
Sohn & Carlson, 2000; Tornay & Milan, 2001).
The chief conditions in which we observed consistent beneﬁts
in switch costs were the response-foreknowledge and complete-
foreknowledge conditions. In these situations, switching costs
were reduced to zero, and in fact were not signiﬁcantly different
from zero for the complete-foreknowledge condition. This again
is understandable if these types of foreknowledge are used to sub-
stitute a pre-packaged directionally speciﬁc motor response that
bypasses any computations related to task setting and stimulus
localization, a strategy in which stimulus onset merely serves as
M. Abegg et al. / Vision Research 51 (2011) 215–221 221a trigger for the execution of the movement. It may be that active
re-conﬁguration is just another computation that is bypassed by
this substitution strategy. If so, this coupled with the general lack
of beneﬁt seen with task or stimulus-location-foreknowledge im-
plies that the computations underlying switching may be relatively
impervious to foreknowledge.
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